ASSURE: Analysis of Safety-Critical Systems Using Formal Methods-Based Runtime Evaluation

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The failure or malfunction of safety-critical aerospace, healthcare, power generation, and transportation systems can have catastrophic consequences for human beings and the environment. This makes it necessary to verify and validate such critical systems in order to guarantee their safe operation. Formal methods can facilitate the rigorous verification of such systems by using mathematical techniques to reason about the properties of the underlying hardware and software components. The ASSURE research program aims to employ formal methods-based techniques for the verification of safety-critical systems and their correctness properties.

More details about our research can be found in the dedicated milestone pages.



Open Source Software:

Comments/suggestions/patches are welcome!


This research is partially supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF), Grant No. CNS-1816307 and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR), DDDAS Grant No. FA9550-19-1-0054.